Far-Right Politicians, the Modern Day Saints of the Christian Church: A look at the religious impact on democracy in modern post-communist societies. Is Secularism Winning, or Just Losing Differently?

Introduction

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The relationship between religion and democracy in Eastern Europe is a complex and often contentious one. Historically, the Church has played a crucial role in shaping cultural and political identities, but in contemporary modern post-communist societies, its influence has taken a more insidious turn. While many assume that secularism is slowly overtaking religion's hold on society, the reality is more nuanced. The Church's influence is less  visible than it once was, but it has not weakened. Rather than serving as a stabilizing moral compass, it has evolved into a political force, aligning with far-right ideologies to maintain its waning power and privilege. This alliance threatens democratic principles, reinforces nationalism, and obstructs progressive social change.

 

This dynamic is particularly evident in Poland, where the Church’s entanglement in politics has fueled a reactionary movement aimed at reshaping democracy into a rigid, exclusionary framework. By invoking a return to a so-called ‘chosen’ path—one steeped in oppressive and undemocratic traditions—religious institutions have effectively positioned themselves as gatekeepers of national identity and moral authority. This article examines the generational tensions between religion and democracy, analyzing the Church’s strategic and often successful efforts to influence political outcomes. It will first explore the historical relationship between democracy and the Church in Eastern Europe. Subsequently, it will investigate how religious institutions strategically align with far-right politics to shape public policy and discourse. Following this, the article will consider the vulnerabilities within society that make citizens receptive to this alliance. Finally, it will examine the Church’s resistance to progressive reforms—particularly around gender and identity—as a broader attempt to preserve traditional power structures.

 

Democracy and the Historical Influence of the Church in Eastern Europe

 

Democracy is built on principles such as individual rights, secular governance, pluralism, and the separation of powers. These principles ensure that no entity wields unchecked influence over political affairs, allowing for the free expression of diverse views within society (Dahl et al., 2019). However, in Eastern Europe, the historical influence of the Church has consistently tested these democratic foundations, shaping national identity and political discourse in ways that blur the line between faith and governance.

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The absence of an Enlightenment movement comparable to Western Europe left Eastern European societies vulnerable to religious institutions maintaining significant social and political control (Żuk & Żuk, 2019). The Cold War deepened this divide, reinforcing traditionalist and conservative values in the East. As a result, modern secularization movements have struggled to gain traction in nations where religion remains deeply intertwined with a  rigid sense of national identity. Even as the region transitioned away from communism, the Church did not retreat from public life—instead, it adapted, leveraging its moral authority to secure political influence.

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This phenomenon is particularly pronounced in Poland. Far from being weakened by decades of communist repression, the Catholic Church emerged in the 1990s with renewed strength, positioning itself as the guardian of national identity, and showing support for  right-wing parties that aligned with its ideological stance. Bishops encouraged electoral participation among Catholics, advertising voting as a moral duty aligned with proper Christian values (Żuk & Żuk, 2019).  Current restrictive abortion laws and the prioritization of religious education in public institutions serve as clear evidence of the Church's direct and effective involvement in shaping public policy.

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Divine Right and Democratic Wrong: The Church’s Political Agenda

 

One striking example of the tightening alliance between Church and State in Poland is the role of Radio Maryja, a far-right Catholic radio station that has mobilized a nationalist movement with deep political connections. The station’s antisemitic and xenophobic rhetoric aligns closely with the nationalist ruling party, PiS (Law and Justice), reinforcing a religious-political partnership that has become increasingly influential. Notably, President Andrzej Duda openly benefited from this alliance in his election campaign, further solidifying the Church’s foothold within Polish governance (Żuk & Żuk, 2019).

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Beyond media influence, this alliance manifests through ideological tools like the “pedagogy of shame”—a strategy that manipulates national emotions to discredit previous regimes, particularly those seen as too pro-Western or liberal (Kobylarek, 2020). By portraying past governments as sources of national humiliation, PiS fosters a sense of reactionary pride that glosses over present-day governance failures and instead rallies citizens around a selective, mythologized version of Polish identity (Kobylarek, 2020). Such manufactured pride finds a powerful echo in the Church’s own use of spiritual shame, particularly in relation to gender, sexuality, and family values. Just as PiS cultivates resentment toward Western affiliations, the Church promotes moral rigidity, positioning any deviation from Catholic doctrine as morally deviant.

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This convergence of political and religious shaming forms a potent mechanism of control: Poles are not only encouraged to feel betrayed by their pro-Western past, but also spiritually condemned if they question the traditional Catholic worldview. In both cases, shame is not used to promote reflection or reform, rather to silence dissent and entrench authoritarian narratives.

Moreover, religious leaders have not hesitated to directly intervene in legislative matters. When parliament passed the In Vitro Fertilization Act in 2015, the Church condemned it as a violation of Catholic moral teachings. Many bishops publicly chastised politicians who supported the measure, reinforcing their influence over public policy. Under PiS, state support for IVF procedures was withdrawn in favor of “naprotechnology,” a Church-approved but less effective method of conception that avoids what it deems the unethical "production" of embryos (Kość, 2023). This policy shift underscores the extent to which Catholic doctrine continues to shape not just cultural discourse, but concrete reproductive rights and medical access in Poland.

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The Left’s Battle Against Religious Conservatism

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As the political landscape in Eastern Europe continues to evolve, the core danger lies not merely in the Church's increasing involvement in politics, but in the vulnerability of its target audiences. Supporters of religious-nationalist parties are often unaware of the long-term consequences of their political choices. Many are misinformed or under informed, persuaded by narratives that equate anti-EU and anti-Western sentiment with patriotism, without fully understanding how such views may erode democratic values and civic freedoms. Research by Savelkoul and Scheepers (2016) reveals that individuals with lower levels of education are disproportionately represented among the electorate of radical right-wing parties. These individuals, the authors argue, are more inclined to submit to strong authority figures and conventional moral norms—psychological needs that are effectively addressed by radical right movements emphasizing traditionalism and charismatic leadership.

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Furthermore, economic insecurity plays a critical role in deepening this vulnerability. A working paper by the European Commission (Inforegio, 2021) demonstrates that regions characterized by high unemployment and stagnant growth, particularly in rural areas, display significantly stronger support for anti-European Union parties. In such contexts—marked by limited opportunity and widespread frustration—supranational institutions like the EU are frequently scapegoated for local socioeconomic hardship. This convergence of educational disenfranchisement and economic precarity creates fertile ground for the spread of populist and religious-nationalist ideologies. Within these communities, the Church and affiliated nationalist parties offer a deceptively simple narrative of salvation—both moral and economic—positioning themselves as the  sole legitimate defenders of tradition, sovereignty, and social order.

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Religious-nationalist parties exploit these informational and emotional gaps, adeptly positioning themselves as the champions of national sovereignty and moral purity. By appealing to popular grievances, they frame themselves as the protectors of economic stability and cultural identity, while portraying the West and the European Union as existential threats. This messaging resonates strongly with individuals facing economic instability and uncertainty, making them desperate for quick and simple solutions—even if, in the long run, such solutions undermine their own interests. 

As Norris and Inglehart (2011) argue, secularization in Eastern Europe is unlikely to take hold without long-term economic security and human development. In the absence of these conditions, the influence of religious institutions is likely to endure and even expand.  The promise to return to “better times,” when national pride and traditional values were upheld fails to acknowledge that such a regression would likely result in renewed isolation and economic stagnation.

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This instrumentalization of religious and nationalistic sentiments is especially troubling given the historical efforts these countries made to join the European Union. Poland, for example, undertook sweeping political and economic reforms throughout the 1990s to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria, culminating in its accession to the European Union in 2004—an event widely celebrated as a return to the European democratic fold (Iwaniuk, 2024). Yet it appears that the hardships and limitations of the pre-accession era have been too quickly forgotten. The profound aspiration to join a stable, democratic, and prosperous Union now stands in stark contrast to the growing willingness to abandon it in favor of a more isolated and uncertain future.

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War on Progress 

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The Church’s unwavering support for patriarchal structures reveals an unsettling truth about its stance on progressive values: it not only resists change but actively fosters division. By reinforcing entrenched societal hierarchies, the Church safeguards its own influence, ensuring that power remains concentrated in the hands of a select few. Historically, religious institutions have been deeply intertwined with patriarchal systems, imposing rigid gender roles and sustaining oppressive social orders (Winkel, 2019). Despite espousing principles of love, acceptance, and compassion, the Church has consistently advocated for a vision of society that is hierarchical, exclusionary, and resistant to change—particularly regarding issues of  gender, sexuality, and class.

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In modern Eastern Europe, this allegiance to patriarchy is more visible than ever, particularly as religious institutions forge strategic alliances with far-right nationalist movements. These partnerships underscore the Church’s commitment to preserving traditional power dynamics. Its stance on abortion, LGBTQ+ rights, and women’s autonomy extend beyond religious doctrine; they represent a calculated defense against any disruption to the status quo. Any challenge to entrenched gender norms is treated as an existential threat to religious authority. These norms often idealize women as obedient mothers and caretakers, reinforcing a rigid binary that punishes deviation from what is regarded as “tradition”. By championing policies that restrict bodily autonomy and reinforce heteronormative ideals, the Church positions itself as the gatekeeper of a society built on submission and conformity.

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As Anderson (2012) explains, feminist theory cannot overlook the central role of gender ideology within religion, particularly when religious institutions are themselves deeply rooted in misogyny and androcentrism. The Church’s commitment to patriarchal structures is not incidental—it is a deliberate, strategic choice that ensures its continued dominance. A genuinely egalitarian society, where individuals are free to define their own roles and identities, would render the Church’s traditional power increasingly obsolete. Instead of adapting to the demands of modern democratic values, the Church remains anchored in the past, weaponizing morality to preserve its influence. Consequently, the Church's involvement in political discourse only serves to hinder the progress of a truly egalitarian society and should be decisively separated from the political sphere.

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Conclusion: Toward a Secular Future?

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The enduring message of biblical teachings—that the kingdom of God transcends gender, ethnicity, class, and age—should serve as a radical foundation for inclusion. Yet in much of Eastern Europe, the Church has traded spiritual integrity for any fleeting political capital, aligning itself with far-right nationalism and wielding fear as a political tool rather than cultivating empathy and compassion. This stark contradiction between professed values and political behavior exposes a deeper crisis of religious institutions clinging to power in a world that is rapidly outgrowing authoritarian moralism. If the Church were genuinely committed to the betterment of society, it would actively champion principles such as equality, justice, and human dignity—values it claims to uphold. However, both historically and in the present, religious institutions have often obstructed social progress, particularly in relation to reproductive rights, LGBTQ+ equality, and gender justice (Witton, 2022).

 

Faith, in its truest form, should offer spiritual guidance, not serve as a political weapon. The objective is not to eliminate religion from public life, but to demand it upholds its own higher, inclusive principles. Condemning faith itself or alienating believers would only deepen the very divisions that allow religious institutions to exploit fear and uncertainty. If religious institutions wish to remain relevant in modern society, they must serve as agents of moral guidance that promote inclusivity, equality, and respect for individual autonomy, rather than as barriers to social progress and democratic values.

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A truly democratic society does not require the rejection of faith, but it does  necessitate the separation of religious authority from the mechanisms of governance. Until religious institutions fully embody the ethical standards they claim to represent, it is the responsibility of democratic citizens to safeguard governance from sectarian influence—ensuring that religious authority remains confined to the pulpit and does not extend into the realm of lawmaking and policy.

 

 

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